Taking ontological realism about social groups as the thesis that groups are composite material objects constituted by their members, this paper considers a challenge to the very possibility that groups be regarded as material entities. Ordinarily we believe that two groups can have synchronic co-extensive memberships-for example, the choir and the rugby team-while preserving their distinctive identity conditions. We also doubt that two objects of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time, which would appear to be the case when groups have identical memberships. I explain that the principle denying the synchronic co-location of objects of the same kind need not apply universally to material objects and that it is a mistake to take resistance to penetrability as a necessary feature of materiality. Therefore, initial appearances notwithstanding, groups can be in the same place at the same time.
Introduction
T he elucidation of the ontological status of social groups is central to an understanding of the social world-the domain of human interaction. The truth conditions of many propositions about the social world depend upon the existential or referential status of groups such as nations, peoples, classes, communities, teams, tribes, and families. In our everyday talk, and in the descriptive and explanatory discourses of the social sciences, a proper understanding of what is said-of what we mean-turns on how we are to treat references to social groups. The justification of moral evaluations, the articulation of practical judgements and action, and the formation of policies depend upon the object of such judgements or actions being an appropriate one. In particular, it must be the kind of thing capable of sustaining such judgements and of being responsive to particular policies and actions.
Realism or holism about groups provides one account of their ontological status. Realism is the thesis that social groups are entities over which we quantify in the set of our best descriptions and explanations of the social world. Realism is motivated by a range of considerations. Reference to social groups is ineliminable in our everyday and formal social scientific discourse. Social groups are objects in their own right, which cannot be reductively analysed out of those descriptions and explanations. Nor can social groups be identified with sets, aggregates, or mereological sums of individuals. For such a strategy of identification fails to account for the survival of a group through membership change or the possibility that a group (the very same group) could have had a different membership. Furthermore, the realist thesis may be extended to the claim that social group can play the role of a natural kind term within social scientific discourse.
Realists about groups may understand a group as either a material or nonmaterial object. The former approach regards groups as part of the material world by their being individualisable objects with causal efficacy and spatiotemporal location; the latter as abstract entities or as being in some way locatable yet nonmaterial.
1 If groups are constituted by individuals, and we 132 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1. For example, Ruben (1985) argues that social groups are spatio-temporally non-material but locatable entities. He also observes that such entities are puzzling. Of course, metaphysical spookiness is not a reason to reject a theory, but it is a potentially high price to pay for holding it. The materialist view of groups has been defended (in different ways) by, inter alia, Hirsch (1982) , Gilbert (e.g., 1989) , and Sheehy (2002 Sheehy ( , 2003 . A rather different form of realism regards it as an old mistake to analyse society in contrastive terms of individuals or groups. A proper understanding of the domain of human interaction requires that we talk in terms of systems and the systemic relations between individuals who are located or sited in particular places and with particular respects to one another at particular times. Thus the social world can be conceptualised in terms of 'systemism' which holds that everything, whether concrete or abstract is a system or a component of one or more systems and that all of these have systemic or emergent properties. . . . [T] he simplest model of a concrete system . . . is the composition-environment-structuremechanism quadruple. . . . [T] here are only interrelated individuals, that is, systems. (Bunge 2000, 403) While I concur with the claim that society be systemically understood and that individuals leading interrelated lives are central to that understanding, such a view must render transparent its ontological commitments. In discussing the systems constitutive of social reality, there is a need to be clear about the relata within that system. The status of individuals-in-relations is precisely what has to be established: for individuals taken together in this way may constitute a group which is ineliminable from our best explanations and descriptions of the social world.
are to analyse the relationship between the individual and the group (the group-membership relation) 2 in terms of the individual being a constitutive element of the group, then there is prima facie reason to favour a materialist form of realism. In the present paper I shall not attempt directly to defend the case for realism or to decide between the forms of realism. Rather, I shall sketch a challenge to materialist realism in order to indicate part of the metaphysical commitment such a view carries. Let me explain.
3
The challenge to the thesis that groups are material objects has this shape. Grant that the motivations sketched earlier furnish a prima facie case for realism. Yet, if groups are material objects, then they fail to behave in a significant way like the other kinds of material objects we encounter in our everyday experience. For two or more groups can be in the same place at the same time, while it is ordinarily held that two objects of the same kind cannot be in the same place at the same time or coincident. 4 Material objects are regarded as excluding other material objects of the same kind from the space one occupies at a particular time.
5 Groups, though, seem capable of being in the same place at the same time because distinct groups can have co-extensive memberships. The philosophy department football team and the university philosophy society possess distinct histories and exert their own effects. Each is individuated in its own right through time. Yet, we can imagine a period in their histories when the memberships are identical. If an object is located where its parts are, then during that period the groups are in the same place at the same time. Realism must explain why this capacity on the part of groups is consistent with the ascription of materiality to groups. Or, realism needs to show how the challenge is disarmed, for example by explaining that groups are not coincident in any way that is inconsistent with an understanding of material objects in general-paradigms of which I take to be cats, trees, Sheehy / Synchronic Identity of Social Groups 133 2. As discussed below, the group-membership relation is not simply the set-membership relation. While any group-member is also a member of a particular set (the set of groupmembers), the very same individuals could be members of the very same set even though the social group were not to exist. For further discussion on the relation between groups and sets, see for example Ruben (1985, ch. 1) .
3. Hereafter I shall refer to the materialist form of realism as simply 'realism.' 4. Throughout I mean 'coincidence' to be complete coincidence. Issues arising from partial coincidence or overlapping objects are left to one side.
5. Cf. Wiggins (1968 Wiggins ( , 1980 , who defends the thesis that the occupancy by one thing of a certain spatio-temporal region excludes all others of the same kind. Leaving aside the possibility of metaphysical vagueness, every material entity can in principle be located uniquely at any particular time. 'No two things of the same kind (that is, no two things which satisfy the same sortal or substance concept) can occupy exactly the same volume at exactly the same time' (Wiggins 1968, 93) . Of course, if one does not endorse that thesis, but understands materiality to permit such co-location, then there is no problem in the first place with respect to groups. Then of course the duty to discharge is that of explaining why we should reject the thesis. and cars. 6 The realist thesis faces the challenge of reconciling the tension between the spatial exclusiveness of material objects and the spatial promiscuity of social groups.
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This challenge relates to a broader discussion concerning the coincidence of material objects. The problem of coincident objects finds expression in the well-known puzzle of whether the statue, S, is identical with the piece of metal, M, from which it is made. The 'standard account' of diachronic identity allows that the two objects, S and M, can indeed coincide while remaining distinct. The key to this view is that the objects differ in their dispositional and modal properties.
8 S can survive changes which M cannot-for example, the loss of an arm-while M can survive change destructive of the statue-say, being beaten into a cube. The two objects are therefore discernible even though they consist of the very same matter so that they are for a period partidentical. A motivation to deviate from the standard arises from the puzzling claim that two objects whose fundamental, base structures are identical (i.e., they have precisely the same physical profile) 9 could differ in their dispositional and modal properties. The broader debate on coincidents moves forward on the supposition that the problem is to explain the coincidence of material objects of different sorts. The narrower issue concerning the coincidence of groups does not (at first glance) share that supposition. For the problem appears to be one of two (or more) objects of the same kind (i.e., social group) being in the same place at the same time. One reason to care about the possibility of real social objects is this: if groups are real material objects which behave as our language suggests, then our understanding of the ontology of material 134 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6. For the purposes of this paper I am restricting the discussion to objects at the level of the everyday 'macroscopic' world: the level of Austin's medium-sized dry goods. The implications, if any, of quantum-level phenomena (e.g., superposition) are not addressed. 7. One might object that no problem of material coincidence is generated because we should understand a group to be brought into existence when its individual members are collectively acting in a certain fashion. The football team exists when its members are playing football together. However, even if a group exists only when its members are collectively producing a certain kind of action, it could be the case that both kinds of action can be carried out at the same time: we discuss philosophy while playing football, and so there are two groups in the same place at the same time. More importantly (and plausibly), ontological realism takes a group to exist when it is not engaged in its characteristic activity, but while its individual members continue to interrelate in the right ways. See discussion of the seminar group in §III, below.
8. The term 'standard account' is due to Burke (e.g., 1997) . Notable advocates of the standard account are Wiggins (e.g., 1980 ) and Lowe (e.g., 1995) . Burke opposes the standard view.
9. As Levey (1997, 3) puts it. This leads to what Levey labels the supervenience problem:
objects in general must permit cases of type-type coincidence. A commitment to realism would be revisionary of the global scope of the thesis that two material objects of the same kind cannot be in the same place at the same time. The failure to support the possibility of type-type coincidence will point to the need to abandon or modify realism (in the latter case, we would have to accept that groups cannot coincide, notwithstanding the way we talk).
Having set out the problem for the realist in §II, I shall examine in the following section ( §III) a realist response to the challenge. In outline, it suggests that two groups can be in the same place at the same time because the individuals constituting them can be organised in distinct ways. Sameness of parts does not entail sameness of fundamental structure. This is a strategy of dissolving the problem. In distinguishing the principles of organisation of parts (the ways in which the individuals interrelate), we individuate distinct groups. That is, individuals organised according to distinct sets of relations are constitutive of distinct groups possessed of their own properties and powers. The puzzle is (it is held) shown to be merely apparent, and the question of the coincidence of groups is addressed in the spirit of the standard account.
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I shall explain that this solution gives rise to a difficulty for the realist. The solution entails the view that whenever there is coincidence, there are different kinds of groups. However, our ordinary and formal employment of the term gives us little reason to think two groups of the very same kind cannot be coincident. Groups may share the same kind of organisation, but be distinguished by extrinsic factors. In the face of this counterintuitive consequence of the diffusing solution, the realist could distinguish cases of different kind coincidence from cases of merger. The latter would be instances of groups of the same kind coming together through co-extensive memberships and thereby merging into a single, 'new' group. Indeed, a diffuser of the challenge might revise her strategy and suggest that all cases of co-extensive membership are to be regarded as mergers. Now, on both the narrower and wider appeal to merger, there is the counterintuitive prospect of fleeting co-memberships giving rise to a new group. Furthermore, how are we to treat the 'reappearance' of the old groups should the new one split back into the 'originals?' Each of the arguments to disarm the challenge forces the realist to amend her understanding of the nature of groups and the ways in which they figure in our folk and formal social scientific discourse.
In §IV I suggest that the realist need not attempt to respond fully in the spirit of the standard account. What that account helps render vivid is that groups Sheehy / Synchronic Identity of Social Groups 135 10. Levey (1997) appeals to the notion of a principle of composition to explain how different kinds of objects can share all of the same parts. It is important to note that Levey defends the possibility of coincident objects while rejecting the standard account. He opposes that account because of its commitment to an abundance of cases of coincidence. Levey doubts that there is a sufficient promiscuity of compositional principles for coincidence to be commonplace.
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possess their intrinsic properties in virtue of the interrelations between their parts-individual persons. Retaining this truth about groups, and in conformity with our use of group terms, 'social group' is to be regarded as a (high-level) kind term in the manner of, say, animal or mineral. While the principle that things of the same kind exclude one another from the same volume at the same time has a wide scope, it does not express a necessary truth about the everyday world, and in particular of social groups. By appeal to certain thought experiments, the realist can attempt to motivate an understanding of social groups concordant with the ways in which we talk about them (and other objects) such that groups are material objects capable of synchronous co-location.
The Problem of Co-location
Integral to our concept of a concrete material object is that such an object can be picked out as numerically distinct from amongst others of the same and different kinds. We can imagine that for a period of time, the philosophy seminar group and the philosophy football team are composed of exactly the same individuals. On the face of it, there does not seem to be a problem in treating them as distinct entities. Each has its own history and impact on the world, and we can develop theories and predictions in respect of each of them. The patterns of relations that form individuals into the seminar group are different from those that constitute them as the football team. The groupconstituting interrelations can be sustained through changes in the membership. The groups are therefore discernible, possessed of distinct histories, effects, and structures. Yet, for as long as they have co-extensive memberships they are also in the same place at the same time.
An objection to the materiality of groups takes the following form. Our intuitive or ordinary understanding of groups is committed to two principles: (SP) : n-number of social groups can share spatial and temporal location (CP): n-number of social groups can have co-extensive memberships at a time Taking another example, this year the village choir may be constituted by the full membership of the von Trapp family. At midnight mass, the von Trapp pews are empty in the church, while the choir has taken its place and is busy singing. It seems reasonable to say that the family and the choir are both in church. Likewise, the university chess club and rugby club may have identical memberships. Both clubs are present when the complete memberships of all the university clubs gather for a rally in protest of declining funding. In both these cases, it seems natural to say that different groups with the same members are in the same place at the same time.
Material objects are subject to two principles:
(MP): Two material objects of the same kind cannot be in the same place at the same time.
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(TM): If G is a whole and if (i 1 . . . i n ) are all of its parts and (i 1 . . . i n ) are material, then G is material.
12 From (MP), (SP), and (CP), we can infer that groups are not material objects. Given the truth of (TM), we can also conclude that individuals are Sheehy / Synchronic Identity of Social Groups 137 11. The occupancy by one thing of a certain spatio-temporal region excludes all others of the same kind. Leaving aside the possibility of metaphysical vagueness, every material entity can in principle be located uniquely at any particular time. Wiggins (1968, 93; 1980) has defended the following principle: 'No two things of the same kind (that is, no two things which satisfy the same sortal or substance concept) can occupy exactly the same volume at exactly the same time.' As noted above (see note 6), discussion is here restricted to the everyday, macroscopic world. It is perhaps arguable that the interpenetration of electromagnetic fields falsifies MP as a global thesis (if electromagnetic fields are material objects). The global scope of MP is also undercut by, say, the capacity of bosons to interpenetrate.
12. First, it is important to be clear that part is employed in (TM) in the sense of being one of the objects which constitutes (with others) a composite object. In the case of a social group, its parts are individual persons who form the group by standing in certain relations. Simply believing oneself to be a member is not sufficient for membership. To be a member of a group is analysable in terms of being a part-a group-constituting part along with those others who stand in the salient set of relations (or stood in the group-constituting relations; it seems plausible that there could be one-person groups when there is just one member left). This notion of being a part of a composite object is not to be confused with the formal mereological concept of being a proper part or with being a member of a set (cf. note 2, above). To be a compositional part is to be some object which actually makes up the object in question. To be such a part of some object as opposed to just some of the stuff of which it is formed, it may also be that a part must be individualisable as some kind of object in its own right. While there is a mereological sum of objects and a set of objects which correspond (to put matters loosely) to the composite object in question (e.g., a cat, a football team), the very same mereological whole or set can exist even when the object qua object does not. Furthermore, the materiality of the members of a set is not transitive to the set, which is an abstract entity.
The question remains whether (TM), innocent of conflation with mereological wholes or sets, is true. A composite material particular occupies a certain spatio-temporal region. In reflecting upon the nature of such objects, it seems that it can do so either because qua whole it is in some way spatially independent of its parts or because it is located where its parts are located. Whatever emergent properties an object might have, it is surely the case that there is (literally) no more to its constitution (its bits) than its parts (and the relations in which they stand). In the absence of a compelling rebuttal of that latter claim, considerations of simplicity and economy suggest that the best explanation of an object's location is the location of its parts (note again that I have restricted the discussion of this paper to the level of everyday objects, so I eschew discussion of the quantum world). That explanation entails the transitivity of materiality from part to whole.
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not constitutive parts of a group. 13 Membership does not entail parthood, and realism about groups must regard them as nonmaterial entities. In order to defend the materiality of groups, one must motivate the rejection of at least one of (MP), (SP), or (CP), or explain why the challenge is only apparent, thereby dissolving the problem it poses.
Materiality and Organisation
The realist response ought to begin by reflecting upon what it is to say that a social group is a material object. Simply put, it is the view that a group is an individual entity with a unity of form and causal capacity through which it can be individuated and located in terms of its spatiotemporal coordinates. Objects respect the distinction between 'self' and 'other.' This distinction is expressible in terms of the difference between the way in which an object's parts interrelate and influence each other and the way in which external entities influence an object. The parts of, say, a cat interrelate to form that particular entity.
14 The unity of form characteristic of a cat is the organisation through time of an aggregate of parts, or a succession of aggregates, in such a way that they form some thing individualisable in virtue of its properties and causal powers. Everyday entities like cats and cars are tangible and visible. They readily satisfy the constraints of being locatable through the assignment of spatio-temporal co-ordinates (they have a definite location, at least at the macroscopic level) and the possession of (normally) sufficiently determinate identity conditions (or, more accurately, the capacity to have such conditions ascribed to them).
It is the organisational relationship between the constitutive parts that yields a whole, which can then stand in a relation to each of those parts. I speak of 'organisational relationship' with some care, since I do not wish to suggest that there has been some kind of intentional or necessary organisation 138 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 13. Cf. Ruben (1985) . The membership relation between the individual and her group would therefore need to be analysed in terms independent of any appeal to members being parts of the group.
14. When a cat dies, it may be argued that its parts are no longer interacting in the right way to constitute a cat, since the object now lacks the vital property of being alive. Its parts do, though, retain sufficient structural integration for some time to constitute a single object. It remains 'enough' of a cat to be accurately described as a dead cat. A dismembered cat does not constitute a single object; it has been broken down into a series of parts, no longer relating in a way constitutive of a cat. If we know enough of the cat's history, and sufficient biology, we can recognise that the parts did once form a whole.
distribution.
of those parts. Rather, in virtue of being related in a certain fashion (however that came about), the parts make or constitute an organism or body through being sufficiently orderly and systematically related. Some bodies, such as houses and dogs, are more readily perceivable (by creatures such as ourselves) as such in space. Others, such as groups, do not share that kind of physical 'solidity,' but the contiguity of parts in our perceptual sphere has no a priori claim to figure in an account of objecthood. Indeed, it would serve to rule out groups as objects prior to consideration of their causal impact or their locatability in space and time.
With the exception of completely indivisible entities or 'simples,' 15 material objects are composite. A house consists of bricks, tiles, and assorted materials arranged in a certain way. A cat is an organisation of flesh, bones, blood, and so on. Following Aristotle we can say that all objects consist of two logical parts-matter and form. Objecthood inheres in the relationship between these two logical parts. They cannot be separated as if they were both physical parts of the object: we cannot divide a statue into its form and the bronze out of which it is made. An object consists in the way in which some further basic objects are organised, the relationships that subsist between the parts that form it. 16 For an object to survive is for its parts 17 to continue to be organised in the relevant object-making fashion, even when those parts may be subject to replacement through time. I do not necessarily endorse an explanation of something's form-the fact that this object is how it is-in teleological terms. Our concern for the moment is to elucidate in what objecthood consists, and one can say that in virtue of being related in Sheehy / Synchronic Identity of Social Groups 139 15. If there are such entities, the main candidates are probably the fundamental entities cited in (some future?) particle physics, selves, and souls. A physical simple entity is presumably a point-sized object lacking proper parts (cf. Sider 2000) .
16. One might object to the notion that an object consists of other parts, preferring instead to put matters of constitution in terms of the basic stuff out of which the object proper (so to speak) is constituted. The kind of object such stuff (e.g., bronze, feline genetic material [?]) constitutes depends upon how that stuff is organised.
17. If we take everything to consist ultimately in the fundamental physical particles, then it may be the case that the parts of any object are changing all the time. However, when we think of something's parts we usually have in mind its proper parts: those things that make it what it is at a particular level of enquiry (here the notion of a proper part is not being used in the technical sense found in mereology-cf. by Goodman in "The Calculus of Individuals"; Leonard and Goodman 1940) . Thus it is my limbs, organs, tissues, and so on that constitute my body, and these in turn are constituted by molecules and atoms and so on. Again following Aristotle, we could say that a hand or an eye has both form and matter. We should perhaps also beware of assuming that each level is well ordered, since order at one level could supervene on disorder at a lower level. That is, there may be no, or no epistemologically accessible (and these possibilities amount to distinct claims), organisation amongst fundamental particles. a certain fashion, the parts make or constitute an object or body through being sufficiently orderly and systematically related.
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A group is constituted by a more or less complex organisation of individuals through time. The existence of a group is contingent on the patterns of interrelations being such that the individuals are united into a whole or body, which comes to exert an impact on the world-typical amongst which is an impact on the members themselves. Ultimately, then, the notion that groups are material objects rests on the view that individuals are related or organised in ways that give rise to a body with causal powers and properties. Groups are composite material particulars constituted by individuals standing in relations through time. This basic conception of a social group as constituted through the being and doing together of individuals, while highly schematic, is also extremely capacious in that it allows a potentially indefinitely wide array of relations between individuals and their practices to constitute a social group. This reflects the diversity of groups we actually encounter. Nuclear families, teams, gangs, mobs, tribes, and peoples are all groups, and they are formed through relations which vary in form, content, and complexity. All the details of the group-constituting relations need to be filled in on a case-by-case basis, typically within a (roughly) drawn framework differentiating groups by function, character, and internal structure.
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On this understanding of groups it is possible to show that (SP), (CP), (TM), and (MP) are consistent. Groups with co-extensive memberships are in the same place at the same time, and they remain distinct entities in virtue of the different ways in which the parts are organised and related. For the period 140 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18. The classification of an object as being a certain kind of thing may depend upon its history. We may argue whether a 'swampman' formed through the chance assembly of atoms is a person, or indeed human or an animal, but would surely agree that it is an object. (For the idea of a swampman, a döppelganger down to the elemental level created in an instant by a chance of nature, see Davidson 1987 . A creature, which comes suddenly into existence with the material and structure of a particular human being, is postulated in order to consider the role of background and context in determining mental content and meaning.) Furthermore, its continuity of form would be explained in terms of the relations amongst its parts.
19. Likewise there are arguably necessary features of the group-constituting relations, which would need to be identified in a full discussion of the nature of groups. It is also worth noting that the wide range of relations which could constitute a group will give rise to variability in the stability, cohesion, and longevity of groups. Just as with other kinds of material objects, so too with groups: some will be internally stable and long lasting, while others will exhibit greater fragility. Moreover, many groups may be dynamic in the sense that their nature and structure develop, particularly as members bring under discursive and critical scrutiny the nature of their relations and their attendant commitments. There is a further set of questions with respect to the kinds of relations which count as group constituting. For example, would the kind of interrelatedness that arises from online or virtual engagement bind individuals into a group? where ≠ is read as 'not numerically identical to.' The conjunction of (P and F) and (NI) is also true. The trio of statements is consistent because of the distinct ways in which the members of S interrelate in order to constitute P and F respectively. We can elaborate P and F as follows:
The difference in the constitutive relations gives rise to distinct groups.
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The groups possess different capacities and survival conditions. Were F to be disbanded (perhaps because of poor results, a collapse in the confidence the rest of the team has in its defence, or so on), then P could nonetheless continue to flourish. Parts of a group-its individual members-are organised and stand in the relations constitutive of that group through time. That there is a coincidence of memberships does not entail that those individuals are organised in a single fashion. On a Wednesday afternoon, individuals who constitute the philosophy seminar group may be engaging in the regular philosophy seminar. However, they do not just constitute the group at that time; they are not the seminar group just when they are actively engaged or primarily conceiving themselves as such. The group exists over time through the relations in which the individuals stand, amongst which might feature the commitment to exchange papers, to keep the group informed of one's intention to miss a session, perhaps to behave in a fashion supportive of the group, and so on. For the period when the seminar group and the philosophy football team have co-extensive memberships, the seminar group exists when just those individuals head off for a match, the team being, so to speak, present during the seminar. 21 Now, in order to hold the four principles consistent, it is necessary to render explicit an assumption central in the foregoing argument. That is, the view that P and F are objects of different kinds. Well, surely, one might urge, they are both groups. However, given that they have been distinguished by the ways in which their (coincident) constituent parts interrelate, it seems that it is just such an organisational distinction which marks a difference between kinds of groups. And for the purposes of (MP), that serves to distinguish them as falling under different kind concepts. The challenge facing realism is dissolved. We were wrong to think that groups of the same kind could be co-located. Our mistake was to fail to recognise the fine-grainedness of the distinctions between kinds of group. Properly speaking, then, the term 'group' ought to be recognised as a high-order kind term or taxonomic division. On this way of considering matters, we modify (SP) so that it reads 'n-number of social groups of different kinds can share spatial and temporal location,' and the problem of coincident social groups is answered in the spirit of the standard account.
Problematic for this approach is the possibility of cases in which groups of the very same kind are coincident. A difference in organising relations is not the only way in which groups (objects in general) can be distinguished. Extrinsic properties are also important such as the relations in which a group stands and the causal role and effects the group has. Taking first the case of noncoincident groups, we can individuate groups of the same kind by their causal effects and the relations in which they stand. Two gangs may have the same internal structure, but differ in terms of, say, their impact and character. One gang may inhabit a city of timid folk and few rival gangs and enjoy great success, while the other gang may struggle in a city with an aggressive population and many rivals. With a juggling of term times and/or really good transport links, we can conceive of the King's College philosophy department being coincident with the Munich department for a period in their respective histories.
The realist could insist that they are different kinds of groups, notwithstanding the fundamental similarity in the ways in which they organised. A difficulty with this first response is that we have no reason to think that two departments, football teams, gangs, and so on are really different types of groups. Indeed, that we gather different groups together under such concepts in our best explanations and descriptions of the social world suggests otherwise. The realist could instead suggest that we do attend to the extrinsic properties of co-located groups as well as their organising relations in distinguishing the groups. Now, though, there are two groups with the same organising principle so as to count as the very same kind which can only be distinguished by their effects and relations. Why, the critic of realism may ask, should we think there are two distinct entities here rather than one group which exerts distinct kinds of effects and stands in a variety of relations? We would in effect have a case of the same thing being picked out under different names or descriptions.
An alternative strategy for the realist is to hold that cases of synchronous co-location be restricted to cases of different kinds of groups sharing memberships. In the case of same kind of co-membership, we should properly say that the groups have merged to form a single entity. This appears somewhat ad hoc, and perhaps insufficiently attentive to the claim that the groups can be distinguished through their extrinsic properties and relations. 22 The idea of merger could, though, be extended to dissolve the problem of co-location in general by holding that whenever there is co-extensive membership, there is also merger, thus giving up (SP) and (CP).
In the recent example, there are not the King's and Munich departments, but a single, new group resultant from their merger. The temporal duration of the coincidence of membership may vary a great deal. Should we say that a fleeting overlap of members gives rise to a new group? Let us imagine that departments share members for a week. What are we to say when this new entity divides back into a King's department and a Munich department? Well, we could maintain either that the very same group can survive a gap in its temporal path or history, or that, in spite of appearances, the new Munich department really is a new entity, standing in some kind of successor relationship Sheehy / Synchronic Identity of Social Groups 143 22. A worry might also arise in cases in which distinct groups are in one sense the same and in another different. The philosophy department and the prison warders of jail X football teams are both teams, and under this kind term, the same kind of thing, and yet they are different kinds of groups in that they are representatives of different institutions. It is, of course, entirely to be expected that a higher order kind term allows us to pick out different objects in respects in which they are at once the same and different. Paul and Peter are both animals; Paul is a small vole, and Peter a human being. With groups the question arises as to whether a period of co-extensive membership brings about a merger with respect to one kind of group, but not the other. Imagine that the philosophers are recruited to the prison football team, so that after a time the philosophy department and jail teams come to have co-extensive memberships. To say that the groups are in the same place at the same time (and are the same and different in the ways described) would need to be analysed in terms of the two football teams being in the same place at the same time through their co-extensive memberships, and each continuing to represent its respective institution through the relations in which the team(s) stand to the different institutions.
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with its predecessor. Alternatively one can avoid postulating gappy identities and preserve the strong sense that the group now, which looks to all intents and purposes like the group 7 days ago, is indeed the very same one. Rather like roads that come together for a short stretch, we could say that both groups are always present in the period of merger. 23 The plausibility of regarding groups as merging into a single entity and then reappearing at some later point will be determined in part by whether one understands persisting objects to endure as continuants or to perdure as occurrents or four-dimensional wholes. This is a dispute about which I shall here merely note that I shall say nothing, save that for my part, I am inclined to regard persisting objects as continuants, being wholly present through the time they exist, and it is in this way that I have thought of objects throughout the present paper.
24
The attempts to diffuse the problem of the synchronic co-location of groups reveal a wide-ranging challenge to the very notion that groups are material. In our talk of groups, and presupposed in the approaches adopted, we have taken 'group' as a higher order kind term which embraces a wide range of exemplars, 'group' seeming to function as do terms like 'animal' and 'artefact.' Yet, in our experience of those latter kinds we find that particular animals or artefacts compete for space. The scope of (MP) appears to be very wide; and the solutions offered in the standard account do not typically allow individuals picked out as belonging to such high-order kinds (e.g., two dogs or two statues) to be coincident. Now, this is not an argument against the possibility of groups being co-located, but it is an appeal for further reasons to think that it is possible. Rather than seek to dissolve the problem, the realist can attempt to motivate the view that (MP) is not universally applicable, and that in particular it does not rule out the co-location of groups. It is to this attempt that the final section of the paper turns.
Possibilities
(MP) may express a truth about the nature of certain kinds of material objects, and in particular medium-sized artefactual and natural objects and organisms. Chairs, rocks, and cats do exclude other objects of the same kind from the space they occupy. Some things, which are locatable and causally efficacious, do not exclude others in the way demanded by (MP). A room can be filled by oxygen, laughing gas, and mustard gas. All are in the same place at the same time, and each has a distinct causal role. We know why the man dies laughing. We can imagine in the case of gases that as a heavy gas sinks, it passes through a level occupied by a lighter gas, so that for at least a moment the two are in the same place. Odours can also be in the same place at the same time: the aroma of freshly brewed coffee and of burnt toast can both be present at the same time in the kitchen. However, perhaps we should not place too much stress on such purported counterexamples. Gases and odours may be better thought of as aggregates of particles of the same kind, and as not being suitable candidates for undercutting (MP) as a claim about objects. 25 Nonetheless, the fact that many objects do respect (MP) appears to be a contingent one. While Locke notes that 'whatever exists at any time excludes all of the same kind, and is there alone,'
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Leibniz suggests that Locke relies on the presupposition that penetration is not conformable to nature . . . but we see two shadows or rays of light which interpenetrate, and we might invent for ourselves an imaginary world in which bodies would act in the same way. But we do not cease to distinguish one ray from another by the very rate of their passage even when they cross each other. 27 We can indeed imagine two billiard balls which are able to pass through each other. 28 We are able to individuate them in terms of their properties and trace their movements. For a period, the balls occupy a single space, and then emerge as they continue along their paths. For the spell during which they have interpenetrated, we are unable to distinguish them by location, but we have good reason to talk of two balls being in that spot because we have traced two distinct histories. Or, in more prosaic terms, we have followed the balls up to the point of merger, and we can continue to trace them after they separate. Moreover, we can tell if the interpenetration has changed a ball in some way because, knowing its pre-penetration properties, we can track the ball through change resultant upon or coincident with the interpenetration. 29 Sheehy / Synchronic Identity of Social Groups 145 25. One might also say that odours are qualia. 26. Essay II.xxvii.1. 27. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding-cited with footnote 27, above, in Sanford (1970, 75) .
28. The example is due to Sanford (1970, 75) . 29. It might be noted that the interpenetration of the balls can only be understood in terms of the respective (micro) structures somehow overlapping completely. The balls do not acquire just the same parts through merger. In the case of groups, interpenetration arises as a result of co-extensive memberships. The point of the ball thought experiment is to suggest that the materiality of objects does not rule out the possibility of synchronous co-location.
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One might reject this approach because one understands the meaning of material when applied to an object to entail impenetrability. This is certainly how Locke regards materiality. Perhaps the concept of an extended material body just is of something which (1) fills a precise three-dimensional region of space, and (2) is in some manner impenetrable to other classes of space occupiers. 30 If this is how we understand the meaning of materiality, then we might see the objection as amounting to this. In the actual world, an object is material just if it is impenetrable, but this does not rule out objects which are material in one world interpenetrating in other possible worlds (the de dicto sense of materiality). This leaves conceptual space for the materiality of groups, but denies that groups are actually material. The understanding of materiality has a de re sense. For an object to be material is for it to possess essentially the property of impenetrability. Again, groups are ruled out of the class of material objects.
The realist can challenge the apparent presupposition that our concept of materiality is fixed. Even if materiality turns out to be an essential property of certain things, we should not think that we have nothing further to learn about the concept and its extension. Through a consideration of social objects, we find reason to deny that impenetrability is a necessary feature of materiality. If groups are causally efficacious entities composed of material parts, then to exclude them from the class of material objects would require an explanation of how a nonmaterial entity can exert a causal influence and of why there is a failure in (TM).
A defence of realism and the materiality of groups cannot quite leave matters at this point. In granting the realist the transitivity of materiality, a problem is also generated. The parts of a group are impenetrable. The realist has argued that groups are material but can be penetrable. Why is the impenetrability of the individual persons not inherited by the group they compose? The answer is that groups interpenetrate by having the same members. The Leibnizian thought experiment shows that there is nothing conceptually incoherent in the notion of interpenetration and that co-location itself does not rule out the possibility of individuating the objects in question through time. In the particular case of groups, we do not have interpenetration involving two distinct sets of parts, and so there is never any question of distinct individuals qua parts having to meld together. 31 Finally, in support of the view that groups can be material objects, it is worth noting that certain organisms do actually have a capacity for fusion 146 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30. Zimmerman (1996, 2) . 31. A further sense in which we can talk of penetration is when someone joins a group as a spy or covert researcher. She interrelates as a member, but with a purpose determined by membership of another group.
and separation, which appears very similar to the behaviour of the imaginary balls. David Hull has noted that 'when presented by a prey too large for a single individual to digest, two amoebae will fuse cytoplasmically in order to engulf and digest it. However, the nuclei remain distinct and the two organisms later separate, genetically unchanged.' 32
Concluding Remarks
In their capacity for synchronic co-location, groups do not behave in the fashion of many other material objects. Nonetheless, this is not a difference that in itself threatens the materiality of groups. Or we should not be inclined to treat it as a threat if we are to admit the relevance of the thought experiments illustrating how objects can interpenetrate one another and be spatially co-located. The admissibility of these examples hangs on whether one regards conceivability as sufficient for possibility. Hume noted that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. On the other hand, the examples may be rejected because they are not really conceivable at all; on a careful analysis, they turn out to be impossible or mock thoughts and so ought not to be taken to indicate the possibility of co-location. 33 To consider the challenge to the status of the counterexample adumbrated in the thought experiment goes beyond the scope of the present paper, but it is a challenge that the opponent of realism may do well to formulate. This paper has examined a challenge to realism about groups. Why should we care about the ontology of the social world? We ought to care because we want to know what we mean when we refer to groups, and the endorsement or rejection of realism is implicated in an account of what we do mean. We also often blame and (sometimes) praise groups. If we are to punish and reward, cultivate what is valuable in a group and expunge what is evil, then we must have an understanding of the kind of entity with which we are dealing. Indeed, we must know whether there is an entity at all which figures in our description, explanation, and understanding of the social world. Perhaps, above all, to treat persons well, with the dignity their personhood commands and with the regard for consequences that their capacity to endure harms and enjoy goods demands, we must appreciate their nature. That is, we must come to understand the ways in which individuals relate to one another and the significance of their context. Realism about groups suggests that one of the ways in which individuals be conceived is as parts of entities which stand on their own feet possessing causal efficacy, and perhaps (dis)value in their own right. To ignore the possibility of real social objects is to ignore a potentially significant element in the lives of persons.
